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SUMMARY 
Although the intention of developing a common transport policy was 
mooted in the early stages of the European Communities, it took the 
form in practice of regulation of isolated transport activities, with the 
aim in every case of removing advantages inadmissible in competition-
policy terms. Only in the 1980s were the sights raised from such insti-
tutional matters to that of developing corridors between regions on a 
continental scale. This period brought the Union’s first White Paper on 
transport, under the motto “a single network for the single market”, 
aimed principally at removing regulatory, institutional and physical 
barriers to links between member-states. The next White Paper, ap-
pearing in 2001, displayed a strong change of outlook with enhanced 
attention to environmental constraints. The main demand was for 
curbs on traffic volume, including a decrease in the proportion of road 
transport. The 2006 revision of the 2001 White Paper marked a sig-
nificant departure from the progressive change of outlook that had 
been initiated, leading to a serious degree of backtracking and refor-
mulation of aims. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
The half-century of history of the Euro-
pean Communities has coincided with a 
new level of globalization of world eco-
nomic processes (in trade, finance, compe-
tition policy, etc.) It has also brought rec-
ognition of the environmental constraints 
and a process of confronting these in a 
global way. The first presents a challenge 
to the EU as a requirement for strengthen-
ing global economic competitiveness, and 
the second as a demand for a response to 
the constraints of sustainability. 
Both challenges present demands for an 
EU-wide transport system, but each makes 
different requirements. Most of the history 
of EU transport policy was dominated by 
competition-policy factors. Not until the 
turn of the millennium did horizontal as-
pects (social, environmental, regional 
catch-up) appear strongly in transport-
system ideas. Nor can the basic principles 
of the latter be said to have affected net-
work-building efforts concerned with ex-
pansion and closer ties between 
neighbours. Indeed the recent re-
examination of EU transport policy seems 
aimed at reversing technical interventions 
relating to environmental requirements 
and restoring the dominance of economic 
                                                   
* The paper appeared in Hungarian in Köz-
Gazdaság 3:4 (2008), 95–106.   
http://www.koz-gazdasag.hu/images/stories/ 
3per4/07-fleischer.pdf. 
globalization based on deregulation and 
liberalization.  
1) FROM EARLY IDEAS TO A 
COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY 
The need for a common European trans-
port policy was mooted when the Treaty of 
Rome was being written, but Future Devel-
opment of a Common Transport Policy 
(CTP 1992), the first Union White Paper 
on the subject, did not appear until 1992. 
It had been preceded by numerous regula-
tions or guidelines of a transport nature, 
but their common attribute had only been 
a concern with creating competition neu-
trality. They included such important 
measures as scrapping of ship cargo ca-
pacity, mandatory rest periods for vehicle 
drivers, and similar matters, but they did 
not amount to a single transport-policy 
approach. The Single European Act of 
1986 was still motivated by desires for un-
disturbed domestic trade and undistorted 
competition while still it formulated ex-
pectations of common European networks. 
Two target areas for common transport 
policy are emphasized. One is a compre-
hensive measure to encompass the earlier 
moves to do with competition regulation, 
i.e. alter the distinct state, regulatory and 
monopoly conditions that reduce perme-
ability in day-to-day operation of trans-
port. The other is to provide physical con-
ditions for expanding connections between 
the 12 (then the 15). Both are expressed 
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well in the guiding principle of the 1992 
Common Transport Policy (CTP 1992) as a 
“single network for a single market”. The 
EU, seeking to exploit existing potentials 
fully, sought to work first on the plane of 
linking up existing networks and institu-
tions in adjacent countries, to which mem-
ber-states had been paying little heed. This 
led to the appearance of the TEN—the 
Trans-European Network—providing EU-
level trunk connections not only in trans-
port (TEN-T), but in energy (TEN-E) and tele-
communications (TEN-C). 
The transport policy adopted in 1992 
certainly did reflect the image of Europe 
prevalent in the period (the later 1980s) 
when it was formulated. The political 
changes in Eastern Europe helped to initi-
ate work on the transport networks of a 
wider Europe, but the requirements in 
principle of such a pan-European network 
were honed only at the 1994 and 1997 
conferences, so that they took effect only in 
the second half of the decade. (This is ana-
lysed further later in the paper.)  
The regulatory/standardizing pillar of 
CTP 1992 can be expressed in a few key 
expressions: inter-operability (to create 
uniform technical standards in transport), 
inter-modality (to break down barriers be-
tween means of transport), free, third-
party access (to ensure competition-
neutral access to the infrastructure), and of 
course the single market. 
The second pillar of common transport 
policy is to produce a grid of connections 
between countries, i.e. furthering the idea 
of a trans-European transport network. 
The EU laid down in 1996 the guidelines 
and key elements of the TEN network. 
Thereafter the focus shifted from the net-
work to completing 14 priority projects 
connected with realizing this. 
2) THE IMPORTANCE OF                        
INTERNAL LINKS 
It is important to underline that the target 
of the EU White Paper was not to solve the 
region’s entire transport question. It did 
not deal with all levels of transport, but 
concentrated on that of inter-regional 
network connections. The elements lacking 
bring a problem of continuity in complet-
ing the Union’s internal system of connec-
tions, as a usable interlocking network of 
links between countries for the standardiz-
ing internal market. It was seen as essential 
to the worldwide competitiveness of the 
common European market to provide paths 
for a viable system of internal connections. 
It is similarly important for transport 
policy in individual countries to ensure 
that national internal connections operate, 
so ensuring the country’s competitiveness. 
These are the paths that production and 
serving units use to connect with each 
other and imbed their activity into the 
country’s economy. Also required are good 
external connections capable of linking the 
operating economies to the international 
flows of business. 
In the period when the acceding coun-
tries were formulating their national 
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transport policies, with the common trans-
port policy as the pattern, Hungary did not 
adopt the line of argument or relative co-
herences (importance of the improvement 
of the internal relations), only the project 
elements of the plan, i.e. priority for the 
international corridors. The overall corri-
dors, as internal connections, are indeed 
important components of pan-European 
competitiveness on the global scene, and 
this applies to Hungary as well. But it is 
equally important for Hungary to think 
through what it is that makes the whole 
country competitive, within the EU or 
more widely. The lesson here is the para-
mount importance of improving this coun-
try’s internal connection networks. 
External and internal connections have 
different functions—external links can ob-
viously not stand in for paths that ensure 
internal cohesion, or vice versa. When 
Hungary builds international corridors at 
the expense of maintenance and develop-
ment of its own transport network, it cer-
tainly contributes to developing the Un-
ion’s internal links, but at the same time it 
neglects the domestic elements through 
which the country can participate in the 
future advantages. 
3) EXTENDING TEN-T:                  
THE SYSTEM OF PAN-EUROPEAN 
CORRIDORS 
By the time the ideas formulated in the 
1980s became Union documents in the 
1990s, the map of Europe had changed. In 
1989, the Berlin Wall collapsed and the 
Iron Curtain disappeared, and it became 
clear one had to think in terms of a larger 
Europe still. The process of approving the 
TEN concepts had been taking its Union 
course, but parallel with that, there began 
in 1991 a process of negotiations called 
the Pan-European transport conference, in 
which (1991: Prague, 1994: Crete, 1997: 
Helsinki) delegates of respective specialist 
ministries accepted plans for so-styled 
“Helsinki corridors” or “Pan-European 
corridors”, i.e. Eastern extension of the TEN. 
What did that imply? Figure 1 shows the 
TEN network of the 1990s with interlocking 
internal corridors covering the EU15: 
 
Figure 1 
The scheme of the TEN-T network 
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Eastern extension of the TEN would give 
a network like Figure 2, extending the 
same type of network to a wider area. 
 
Figure 2 
An extended TEN-T network 
 
 
 
But this did not happen. No doubt in the 
euphoria of the 1990s, improving East–
West relations seemed on both sides to be 
the task, and this effort clouded longer-term 
thinking. Priority was given only to extend-
ing the East–West corridors (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 
Schematic extension of the East-West corridors 
 
 
In the event, this East–West was less 
schematic than Figure 3 portrays, partly 
because Europe becomes wider to the East, 
and partly because there was Western de-
mand for links to the north-east from Italy 
and south-east from Germany too. This 
produced something like Figure 4, which 
may even be called a network, but still dis-
plays a different pattern from the original 
TEN-T network designed to improve inter-
nal connections among the EU15. 
 
Figure 4 
Extension of the East–West corridors of the 
TEN-T network  
 
  
 
In the actual Pan-European network 
there are no North–South corridors except 
Corridor 9 (Finland and Greece), only ones 
going east from the EU15, then veering 
north or south (Figure 5). The North–South 
connections established by this are clearly 
more accidental than planned. At any rate, 
whatever has emerged is remote from the 
original intention of a grid network to bal-
ance spatial inequalities.1 
Apart from the ten Helsinki corridors, 
four Pan- European transport areas (PET-
RAs) were delineated, as bases for water 
navigation. 
                                                   
1 Even recently, some EU documents have not pro-
gressed beyond the unilateral effort described here. 
See White Paper on Services of General Interest. 
COM(2004) 374 final. Commission for the Euro-
pean Communities, Brussels, 12. 5. 2004. 3. 3. 
“The Commission’s policy in the area of Trans-
European Networks is improving access to trans-
port, energy and communications networks in the 
more remote area and will assist in linking the new 
Members States with the infrastructure of the Fif-
teen” (this author’s italics). 
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4) EXTENSION OF THE            
PAN-EUROPEAN CORRIDORS                      
AS THE TINA NETWORK 
The development of the Pan-European 
network to link with the East–West ele-
ments of TINA led to a realization after the 
first happiness waned that the Pan-
European corridors are far from meeting 
the demands for inter-regional and supra-
national transport connections that emerge 
in the area brought in by enlargement. For 
instance, no single Pan-European corridor 
crosses the East–West border between Slo-
vakia and Hungary anywhere to the East of 
Bratislava—a section more than 600 km 
long. Because of such problems the so-
called Transport Infrastructure Needs As-
sessment (TINA) process was launched in 
1995, still at the time of a series of the 
Pan-European conferences. In this frame-
work the transport experts of the EU15 
give professional advice to high-level 
transport administrations of 11 candidate 
countries (the 12th being Malta) on how 
to assess their transport infrastructural 
needs. The 1999 closing report slipped 
from advice to declaration of further cor-
ridors, and defined network elements with 
primary and secondary priority. The pri-
mary corridors—to the glory of the meth-
odological knowledge transferred—were 
unanimously acclaimed, or at least voted 
for “without visible opposition”: they 
should be identical with the Helsinki corri-
dors evolved by that time (TINA Final Re-
port). It was never clearly defined what 
secondary priority meant, but it seems that 
these elements did not get TEN-T status (or a 
chance of EU Cohesion Fund support) after 
accession. 
Up to the comple-
tion of the closing pa-
per of 1999 Hungary 
had two segments of 
corridor increasing 
the density of the 
missing North–South 
links as TINA elements: 
the route to Budapest 
from the north and 
the domestic section of 
the Košice–Oradea 
connection (Figure 6 
continuous lines). In 
the following year 
Hungary tried to add 
two other corridors to 
Figure 5 
The Pan-European (PEC or Helsinki) corridors 
 
 
Source: KTI – GKM http://www.gkm.gov.hu/data/8568/Image11.gif. 
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the secondary TINA corridors proposed 
earlier (Figure 6 dotted lines). This was not 
successful because the process had been 
closed, but it seems to make no real differ-
ence whether a corridor is an accepted 
secondary TINA element or just a section 
developed by the country itself.  
To sum up, three main problems appear 
in  the  planning  of  Hungary’s  transport 
corridors. (1) The international corridors 
take precedence over the domestic. (2) The 
plan for the overlapping network of the 
expanded EU is not an interlocking net-
work that considers the internal coopera-
tion of the whole Union, but one that gives 
priority to East–West extension of the 
EU15 network envisaged in the 1990s, to 
link it with the expanded territories. 
This priority in the Central-East Euro-
pean region neglects the links of the EU12 
with each other, notably North–South 
connections. (3) The third problem has 
only been mentioned in passing: Hungary’s 
transit-corridor development has not only 
unduly emphasized, but makes the struc-
tural mistake of repeating the earlier radial 
character of the main networks. Not even 
in outline does it serve to even out regional 
differences, only to enhance its concentric 
nature and widen the gap between capital 
city and provinces. The Hungarian trans-
port policy devised in 1996 may have pro-
Figure 6 
Domestic Helsinki corridors and accepted (continuous) 
and additional (broken) TINA Corridors 
 
 
Source: A 8. sz. főút fejlesztési feladatai... (Development tasks for Route 8…) UKIG Hálózatfejlesztési Főosz-
tálya, September 13–15, 2000. 
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fessed a subtler system of priorities, but in 
effect helped perpetuate the corridor prob-
lems outlined.  
5) TIME TO DECIDE: A NEW 
WHITE PAPER FOR TRANSPORT 
POLICY 
Nine years after the earlier White Paper 
came a newer EU transport policy in Sep-
tember 2001 (White Paper 2001). This 
begins by reviewing frankly the mixed re-
sults with its predecessor. The competitive-
market aims were largely fulfilled—
consumer prices fell, service quality im-
proved, technology spread, and the closed 
transport markets were opened up (except 
for rail)—but the dysfunctional features 
had not been alleviated. The uneven spatial 
development remained and so did conges-
tion at the centre, while shortcomings in 
provision in remoter areas remained typi-
cal of the Union as a whole. (“Apoplexy in 
the centre and paralysis at the extremities” 
as the documentum writes). There was 
congestion on main roads and railways, in 
cities and in the air. Mounting health and 
environmental damage, and shocking ac-
cident figures. 
This line of development is unaccept-
able to 21st-century society. 
The 2001 White Paper built the envi-
ronmental recommendations of the 1990s 
into its proposals, and aimed to ensure that 
the quantity of traffic would not rise with 
economic development (“decoupling”). It 
expressed the purpose of curbing the in-
crease in road traffic by three means: (1) 
pricing and regulation in the road sector, 
(2) improving the efficiency of other 
means of transport, so that they could offer 
an alternative to road, and (3) in the 
meantime executing some necessary in-
vestment projects in the infrastructure. 
These infrastructural developments were 
automatically associated with the TEN-T 
network, in a slightly reconsidered, re-
examined form. 
The tasks of implementing the White 
Paper were designated in 60 measures in 
four blocks: (1) changes in the proportions 
between transport modes, (2) elimination 
of bottlenecks, (3) development of a user-
centred transport policy, and (4) handling 
the globalization of transport. 
All in all, the 2001 White Paper made a 
significant step forward in its principles. It 
recognized that for progress in EU trans-
port, it would not suffice to concentrate on 
inter-country links. Transport-policy ob-
jectives had to be harmonized in depth and 
outlook. It revised the approach of the 
1990s and came out firmly for change in 
environmental and social matters. 
6) RE-EXAMINATION OF THE 
TEN PRINCIPLES (2004) AND 
FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
As introduced above, the 2001 White Pa-
per followed a timely reconsideration of 
tasks of the common transport policy while 
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had not touched on TEN, indeed had 
seemed to confirm it, as the investments to 
be promoted were all related to TEN. But 
implementation of the decided 14 projects 
was badly delayed, and it became clear 
that most of them were not receiving the 
kind of priority in each member-state that 
would allow EU contributions with a ceil-
ing of 10 per cent to provide any incentive 
to complete them. 
In 2003, a committee chaired by the 
Union’s earlier transport commissioner 
presented recommendations for revising 
TEN (Van Miert Report 2003). It stated that 
improving the execution of the projects 
called for changes in the TEN guidelines 
and the appointment of coordinators for 
each, along with a higher EU financial 
contribution. It went on to propose further 
new projects alongside the uncompleted 
ones. 
The re-examination of the TEN guide-
lines was clearly not concerned with des-
ignating the network, revising its structure 
or envisaging an expanded area (or the 
problems raised by this). It dealt mainly 
with the TEN guidelines for priority pro-
jects, above all with making the implemen-
tation run more smoothly. 
The report passed through the Union’s 
bureaucratic forums relatively quickly and 
was endorsed by the Commission on April 
29, 2004, just two days before the acces-
sion of the Ten. It gave priority to 30 pro-
jects instead of 14 and raised the EU finan-
cial contribution from 10 per cent to 20 
(Decision 884/2004/EC és Corrigendum 
to the Decision 884/2004/EC). 
The re-examination ignored the net-
work considerations to such an extent that 
(to this writer’s knowledge) it is nowhere 
recorded officially whether the Pan-
European or the TINA network was to be-
come part of the TEN network after the ac-
cessions.2 It appears that during the nego-
tiations of the transport operative pro-
grammes, the Union treats the Pan-
European corridors (the top-priority TINA 
network elements) as TEN networks that 
could be supported out of the Cohesion 
Fund, and not the secondary priority ele-
ments initiated by member-states. Confir-
mation of this can be found in a committee 
memorandum prepared by DG–TREN that 
does not deal directly with this question 
(Guidelines 2007): “Following enlarge-
ment, the Pan-European Corridors are now 
mainly within the EU and thus part of the 
TEN network.” 
This treatment of the Pan-European cor-
ridors as appendices of the TEN elements 
did not mark a break with 1997 or de-
lineation of the Helsinki corridors. A 
document on the transport infrastructure 
of the Balkans that appeared in 2002 
(TIRS—Transport Infrastructure Study in 
Balkans) and covers seven countries in that 
time3  (ALB, B-H, BG, CR, SR-M, MAC, RO) 
laid down that the basic network in Bul-
garia and Romania is identical with the 
corridors decided earlier in the TINA proc-
                                                   
2 Undeniable that the 2nd attachment’s 8/F section 
of the Treaty of Accession (2003) offers maps of the 
TEN network, containing priority and secondary 
TINA corridors together with other corridors; while 
no modifications or comprehensive numbering of 
TEN elements seem to appear on other relating sites 
dealing with TEN-T corridors. 
3 Serbia and Montenegro became two countries 
since. 
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ess, while for the other countries, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) con-
ducted a survey (Western Balkans Trans-
port Infrastructure Inventory) that named 
and categorized financially 223 potential 
projects (TIRS 2002). 
The next process, beginning in 2005, 
took the new neighbourly relations of the 
EU27 into account in designating further 
“transnational axes” labelled “North”, 
“Central”, “South-East” and “South West”, 
with the “maritime highways” as the fifth 
axis (Figure 7). 
7) RE-EXAMINATION OF THE 
WHITE PAPER: ROAD HAULAGE 
STRIKES BACK? 
While the 2001 transport policy stressed a 
definite need to halt growth in transport 
performance and slow the increase in road 
traffic, the re-examination (Keep Europe 
moving 2006) can be considered as a sig-
nificant withdrawal. 
Figure 7 
Five transnational axes to assist trade and regional integration 
 
 
Source: Guidelines 2007. Guidelines for transport in Europe and neighbouring regions. 
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It has been noted that the 2001 White 
Paper examined the mistakes made and 
stressed the need for significant change. 
The re-examination in 2006 underlined 
the continuity of basic principles in trans-
port policy, so reversing the clear turn 
(“Time to decide”) to environmental 
friendliness. 
The White Paper had pointed out how 
the share of road transport was still rising 
despite efforts to curb it: this had to be 
changed. The re-examination saw this as 
an achievement: “The internal market has 
contributed to creating competitive inter-
national road haulage and increasingly 
also rail operations. Moreover, the last five 
years have seen the effects of globalisation 
leading to the creation of large logistics 
companies with worldwide operations” 
(Keep Europe moving 2006 p. 5.). 
The White Paper had talked of curbing 
the increase in volume (separating eco-
nomic growth from traffic growth). The 
re-examination also sought to separate, but 
in a different sense: “Mobility must be dis-
connected from its negative side effects”, 
means ensuring traffic growth rather, not 
curbing it. (ibid. p. 4.) 
The principles of the White Paper had 
seen the curbing of road transport and in-
tervention to that end as a policy task. The 
re-examination was concerned “to opti-
mise each mode’s own potential”, which 
would mean just avoiding intervention be-
tween them. (ibid. p. 4.) The new docu-
ment also defined optimization goals 
(“each transport mode must be optimised”, 
and “the efficient use of different modes on 
their own … will result in an optimal and 
sustainable utilisation of resources.”) 
where these did not tie in with sectoraly 
integrated policy-level assignments. (ibid. 
p. 21.). Rather than openly rescinding the 
earlier interventionist objectives (shifting 
the balance between modes), it did so in 
effect by its omissions. Yet although it sur-
rounded it with provisos, the re-
examination nonetheless declared that 
“sustainable mobility policy therefore 
needs to build on a broader range of policy 
tools achieving shifts to more environmen-
tally friendly modes where appropriate, 
especially on long distance, in urban areas 
and on congested corridors” (ibid. p. 21.). 
Such sentence in the re-examination as: 
“The efforts to achieve the goals of meeting 
growing mobility needs and strict envi-
ronmental standards are beginning to 
show signs of friction” (ibid. p. 29.) sought 
to imply quite strongly that strict environ-
mental protection should be restored  
So in general, the 2006 re-examination 
of the 2001 EU White Paper on transport 
diverged strongly from the progressive line 
taken in the latter, while trying to empha-
size continuity by omitting to say so 
openly.4 
                                                   
4 Another consideration: the 2001 White Paper, 
published on September 12, 2001, though prepared 
before 9/11, and arrived in a world where the 
globalization processes would be reappraised and 
neo-conservative and fundamentalist schools of 
thought become stronger (especially outside Europe 
and the EU). This had its effect on Europe, even 
though the underlying ideology was felt less 
strongly.  
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8) CONCLUSIONS 
Growing awareness of environmental 
problems in the final third of the 20th cen-
tury shook the foundations of the para-
digm based on the assumption of unlimited 
availability of resources and of unlimited 
ability of the environmental absorption. It 
emerged globalization covered not only the 
scope for relations, but the constraints on 
development emerging as marginal condi-
tions. 
All sectors face ecological constraints, 
though they affect agriculture, water man-
agement, commerce, consumption, or 
transport in different ways. 
Direct boosts to the technology devel-
opment of transport promoted the “open-
ing up” of ever greater areas, its unifica-
tion. The development of maritime naviga-
tion played a huge role at the dawn of the 
Modern Era in promoting colonization as 
an early form of globalization. The devel-
opment of railways offered mass accessi-
bility to the furthest corners of countries, 
while also easing transport between cities 
and the communities round them. So 
transport presaged huge changes both spa-
tially and globally, and the consequences 
can also be described in terms of continual 
adaptation of the way of life to the spatial 
relations defined by the new technical op-
portunities provided by transport. 
For most of the 50-year history of the 
European Union and its preceding institu-
tions, the bottleneck to broadening the 
common-market concept was the short-
comings in legal, institutional and regula-
tory forms, while the physical infrastruc-
tures of member-countries more or less 
sufficed for the mounting international 
traffic. The main motive behind the trans-
port-related “common-market” regulation 
of that period was to eliminate factors that 
were distorting competition, instigated, of 
course, by those who felt disadvantaged by 
the absence of uniform regulation and had 
the power to carry the regulatory action 
through. 
The situation in the 1980s encompassed 
not only competition-policy institutions, 
but demand for the standardization, su-
pervision, and where absent creation of 
inter-regional overlapping physical links 
on a continental scale. As with the national 
networks earlier, the technical establish-
ment of the physical links and the increase 
in the demand for them developed as an 
iterative process, with the two factors 
boosting each other. 
This period brought the first EU trans-
port White Paper, with the motto “a single 
network for the single market”. The main 
task was seen to be the elimination of ob-
stacles to contacts between member-states. 
The ensuing 2001 White Paper marked a 
strong change of outlook and broad atten-
tion to environmental constraints. Its main 
intention was to curb traffic and reduce 
the proportion of road traffic. Although 
tendencies in 2007–8 in relation to climate 
change meant that more value was being 
attached to the global environmental di-
mension again, attention was distracted 
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after 2001 by mounting attention to the 
criterion of global security. This may have 
played a part in the fact that the 2006 re-
examination of the 2001 White Paper 
brought some backtracking and rephrasing 
of objectives compared with the earlier 
progressive direction that Union transport 
policy was taking. 
 
* * * * * 
REFERENCES 
A 8. sz. főút fejlesztési feladatai (2000) 
(Development tasks for Route 8). Bu-
dapest: UKIG Hálózatfejlesztési Főosz-
tálya, September 13–15, 2000. 
Corrigendum to the Decision 884/2004/ 
/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 29 April 2004 
amending Decision 1692/96/EC on 
Community guidelines for the devel-
opment of the trans-European trans-
port network (text with EEA rele-
vance). Official Journal L 201, 07/ 
/06/2004, 0001–0055 
CTP 1992. The future development of the 
common transport policy—a global 
approach to the construction of a 
Community framework for sustain-
able mobility. Brussels: Commission 
of the European Communities, COM 
(92) 494. 
Decision 884/2004/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 amending Decision 
1692/96/EC on Community guide-
lines for the development of the 
trans-European transport network 
(text with EEA relevance). Official 
journal L 167, 30/04/2004, 0001—
0038. 
Guidelines 2007. Guidelines for transport 
in Europe and neighbouring regions: 
extension of the major trans-
European transport axes to the 
neighbouring countries and regions. 
Memo, European Commission, Di-
rectorate General for Energy and 
Transport http://www.cluster-
maritime.fr/pdf/2007_guidelines 
_tent-en.pdf  
KTE Páneurópai folyosók (Pan-European 
corridors). http://www.gkm. 
gov.hu/data/8568/Image11.gif. 
Downloaded in 2004. 
Keep Europe moving—Sustainable mobility 
for our continent. Mid-term review 
of the European Commission’s 2001 
transport White Paper. Communica-
tion from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parlia-
ment. COM (2006) 314 final.  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ 
/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:031
4:FIN:EN:PDF. 
TINA (1999): Transport infrastructure 
needs assessment (TINA) final report. 
Vienna. Phare EC DG IA – EC DG VII 
– TINA Secretariat, October 1999. 
17 
 
TIRS (2002): Transport infrastructure re-
gional study (TIRS) in the Balkans. 
Final report prepared by Louis Berger 
SA, March 2002. ECMT–Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD). 
http://www.cemt.org/topics/tirs/ 
TIRSfinal.pdf. 
Van Miert Report (2003): High level group 
on the Trans-European Transport 
Network. Report 27 June 2003 
http://ec.europa.eu/ten/ 
transport/revision/hlg/2003_report 
_kvm_en.pdf. 
White Paper 2001: European transport 
policy for 2010: time to decide. Of-
fice for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 2001 ISBN 
92-894-0341-1 [CEC, COM (2001.) 
370]. 
 
